In order to develop a model of equitable and sustainable distribution, this paper advocates integrating the ecological space paradigm and the capabilities approach. As the currency of distribution, this account proposes a hybrid of capabilities and ecological space. Although the goal of distributive justice should be to secure and promote people's capabilities now and in the future, doing so requires acknowledging that these capabilities are dependent on the biophysical preconditions as well as inculcating the ethos of restraint. Both issues have been highlighted from the perspective of the ecological space paradigm. Concerning the scope of distributive justice, the integration can combine the advantages of the ecological space paradigm regarding the allocation of the responsibilities involved in environmental sustainability with the strength of the capabilities approach regarding people's entitlements.
Introduction
Although countries across the world have been converging towards higher levels of human development, the global situation is characterized by both social injustice and unsustainability.
First, despite the observable progress, there are still large disparities in, for example, income and health (United Nations Development Programme -UNDP 2013, p. 23). Second, the gains in human well-being over the last decades have been achieved at a cost, including the degradation of ecosystems, substantial and irreversible losses in biodiversity, increased risks of nonlinear changes (such as disease emergence and abrupt regional climate shifts) (MEA 3 Other operationalizations of the ESP include Environmental Utilization Space (Opschoor & van der Straaten 1993) , Material Flow Analysis (Bringezu & Moriguchi, 2002) , Industrial Metabolism (Ayres 1997) and other indicators of environmental sustainability. 4 Methodological issues have been predominantly discussed regarding the Ecological Footprint (e.g., van den Bergh & Grazi, 2010; van den Bergh & Verbruggen 1999; Fiala 2008) , although Nature Reports Climate Change has dedicated a special issue to scrutiny of the SOSH framework (Vol. 3(10), October 2009; e.g. Allen 2009) . A discussion of these methodological issues falls beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the most important normative issues are mentioned in the remainder of this section, although as yet, they arguably remain underdeveloped in the literature. increasingly becomes unavoidable (Le Quéré, 2009, p. 831; Dirix et al. 2013) . Moreover, this is not only a methodological issue, but also a normative one, for it involves the questions of how much climate change is acceptable and to what extent we are willing or able to mitigate global warming: identifying "dangerous" climate change is 'a complex task that can only be partially supported by science, as it inherently involves normative judgements ' (Rogner et al. 2007, p. 99) . Indeed, despite general political agreement regarding the 2°C target, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has declared that global warming must be kept well below 1.5°C (2012, Paragraph 8A), since they are especially vulnerable to and already experiencing climate change adversities (AOSIS 2012, Paragraph 1-3; UNDP 2011, pp. 35-36) . In contrast, richer societies -who have polluted most -might be disinclined to adopt more conservative thresholds, because these require most mitigation efforts from them first, while they have the greatest interest in the continuation of the current system (Biermann 2012, p. 6; Gardiner 2006, p. 401) .
Even in view of these methodological, normative, and political complications, Biermann insists that a framework such as the SOSH is likely to develop into a powerful political narrative -as Ecological Footprint Analysis arguably already is. Moreover, all the operationalizations mentioned above clearly show that humanity is currently transgressing the ecosphere's biophysical constraints. To mention but one example, the key finding of Rockström and colleagues (2009, p. 472) in their analysis of the SOSH is that humanity has already left its safe operating space by trespassing the planetary boundaries of at least three systems (biodiversity loss, climate change and interference with the nitrogen cycle), and is rapidly approaching several other boundaries (freshwater use, land-system change and, arguably, ocean acidification). In sum, even though the scientific uncertainties and methodological issues remain significant, the ESP undeniably shows that humanity's current demands are unsustainable and that action is urgently needed for tackling climate and other adverse environmental changes.
Yet, despite these insights, designating ecological space as the currency of distribution faces certain objections. It has been observed that ecological space is an all-purpose means required to have a good quality of life, rather than being a direct measure of well-being (Page 2007, pp. 460-461) . Sen (1979, p. 216; 1990, pp. 119-120) has argued that such resourcist accounts have an element of 'fetishism', because they focus on means rather than ends, whereas quality of life should be conceived as a relationship between persons and goods.
Indeed, for example, GHG emission permits (but also other parts of ecological space) only have instrumental value in relation to their ability to pursue various goals (Caney 2009, p. 130) . Moreover, many issues of social justice -such as the political underrepresentation of women or personal disadvantages related to mental or physical illness -cannot be traced to environmental problems or to the appropriation of environmental goods (Page 2007, p. 461) .
Since ecological space as the currency of distribution is only indirectly connected to human well-being, it seems unable to provide a comprehensive focus of our distributive concerns. In sum, the ESP cannot be said to offer a complete account of distributive justice, for even though it delivers valuable insights on environmental sustainability, it is inadequate to capture issues of social justice beyond the distribution of environmental goods and services.
In view of his objections to resourcist accounts, Sen (1999, p. 74) advocates a focus on 'the substantive freedoms -the capabilities -to choose a life one has reason to value', rather than on the means to freedom. However, the capabilities approach's emphasis on the value of individual freedom -including the possibly infinite expansion of people's material freedoms and capabilities -cannot adequately address environmental sustainability (Crabtree 2010, p. 163; Peeters et al. 2013, pp. 63-64) . Indeed, the issues central to environmental sustainability have only recently been taken up by capability theorists (see e.g. Holland 2008; Lessmann 2011; Lessmann & Rauschmayer 2013; Pelenc et al. 2013; Schultz et al. 2013 ). These debates mainly point towards two problematic issues in the capabilities approach related to environmental sustainability: first, it arguably disregards the importance of the biophysical preconditions for enjoying capabilities; and second, it has not yet exhaustively addressed the imperative of environmental sustainability that fundamentally requires humanity to refrain from transgressing the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere. Addressing these two issues and connecting the environmental dimension with human flourishing that is central to social justice solicits the input of theories external to the capabilities approach (Schultz et al. 2013, p. 130) . Therefore, especially in light of the advantages mentioned above, we argue that the ESP can offer certain insights needed to incorporate the importance of the biophysical preconditions as well as the requirement to refrain from transgressing the ecosphere's biophysical constraints.
First, the capabilities approach does recognize the central importance of the health of ecosystems for allowing people to lead the lives they value (Anand & Sen 2000 , p. 2030 Sen 2010, p. 130; 2013, pp. 7-8; Nussbaum 2011, p. 163) . Nonetheless, this acknowledgement of the role of the environment as a key dimension of human wellbeing remains ambiguous in both Sen and Nussbaum's versions of the capabilities approach (Holland 2008, p. 320; Pelenc et al. 2013, p. 78) . Therefore, Holland (2008, p. 323) has proposed the addition of Sustainable Ecological Capacity as a meta-capability, which encompasses the ecological conditions that can provide environmental resources and services that enable people's range of capabilities now and in the future. The ESP and its concretizations offer information about the ecological conditions and the sustainable appropriation of the environmental resources and services.
In accordance with Holland's account, we propose to differentiate between social and material preconditions for enjoying capabilities. For example, the bodily integrity capability includes being able to move freely from place to place (Nussbaum 2006, p. 76) , which clearly presupposes the availability of material conditions (such as adequate transportation), as well as particular social conditions (for example, robust traffic regulations). As the ESP clearly shows, material justice -securing these material conditions for everyone -'has its own precondition, namely the integrity of the compendious resources of the biophysical world' (Hayward 2009, p. 292) . Differentiating between social and material (and thus, environmental) preconditions for enjoying capabilities acknowledges our dependency on the environment, rather than interpreting capabilities as 'a set of disembodied freedoms ' (Jackson 2009, p. 45) .
Second, the assumption of environmental sustainability that 'the current generation might have to restrict itself in some ways (e.g. restrict its consumption) in order to ensure the preservation of the opportunity for a full life for future generations ' has not yet been given profound theoretical consideration by the main protagonists of the capabilities approach (Lessmann 2011, p. 50) . For example, in their attempt to deal with the issue of sustainable development, Anand and Sen (2000, p. 2038 ) focus on enhancing current people's capabilities as not only intrinsically important, but also instrumentally important in 'increasing their "human capital" with lasting influence in the future,' which should be seen as a major contribution to the achievement of sustainability. This might be true in cases such as women's empowerment and reproductive rights, which are inherently valuable and have positive spillover effects on the environment through reducing fertility rates (Sen 1999, p. 226; 2009, p. 249; 2013, p. 15; UNDP 2011, pp. 73-75) . (Jackson 2009, p. 102), and for leading to consumer anxiety, work stress and lack of time to enjoy other (e.g. social, cultural and political) activities. 6 Nonetheless, the question arises as 6 Hayward (2009, pp. 290-293) mentions that the imperative of restraint is not only a matter of the right (through its focus on the harm principle and the universal right of access to the necessary means for a decent life, which include biophysical assets), but a matter of the good as well, since it gives rise to a 'green' conception of the good life and to 'green' virtues. However, the capabilities approach does not accept this latter interpretation, because it conflicts with the value the capabilities approach places on liberal neutrality between conceptions of the good life (Nussbaum 1998). Moreover, we would like to note that a reevaluation of the benefits people draw from their material consumption in our example can also be merely informative regarding the trade-offs they to how to evaluate the benefits of our activities, because the ESP's focus on the means necessary for well-being is vulnerable to Sen's criticism of "fetishism" mentioned above. The benefits from environmental appropriation should therefore be evaluated in terms of social justice -and thus quality of life -but given its focus on resources, the ESP is inadequate to do this.
In sum, we recommend integrating the ESP and the capabilities approach. On the one hand, the currency of distribution should reflect the focus on people's entitlements and their ability to pursue flourishing -a key part of the capabilities approach. On the other hand, distribution should take account of the preconditional character of the integrity of ecosystems by differentiating between material (and environmental) and social conditions for enjoying capabilities, based on the information about environmental resources and services provided by the ESP. Moreover, an ethos of restraint -to which the ESP clearly draws our attentionshould be incorporated. We will return to operationalizing the latter when discussing the pattern of distribution, but we must first turn to the question of scope.
Scope: who are the legitimate recipients and providers of (re)distribution?
While other currencies of distributive justice (such as welfare, resources and, as we will explain below, capabilities) are primarily designed to apply to relations of distribution between contemporaries, with their intertemporal implications being a matter of further deliberation, 'ecological space turns this methodological approach on its head by embracing an explicit commitment to intergenerational justice at the outset' (Page 2007, p. 461) . Central to the ESP is the protection of the physical integrity of ecosystems that provide the material preconditions for current as well as future people's well-being. The ESP shows that humanity's current material demands exceed the carrying capacity, which constitutes injustice towards future people since their quality of life will be adversely affected.
Through this focus on the unjust impacts of human activity on environmental integrity, the ESP is consistent with the preservation of the earth's ability to sustain life, a central requirement of justice towards future people (Chambers et al. 2000, p. 46; Page 2007, p. 460 ).
However, its applicability to distributive justice between contemporaries remains questionable, since the ESP does not adequately address social justice: it merely focuses on might experience between material prosperity and social participation -both of which they might valuewithout necessarily advocating a particular conception of the good life. However, since these issues need further analysis, we limit discussion here to the interpretation of the imperative of restraint as a matter of the right.
the means to achieve a good quality of life and many inequities are not traceable to the appropriation of ecological space.
In contrast, the advantage of the capabilities approach is that it captures well-being directly in terms of freedom, which we consider to be essential for justice between contemporaries as well as for social justice in general. Yet, the applicability of the capabilities approach towards future people remains a matter for deliberation and is increasingly discussed in recent literature. Anand and Sen (2000, p. 2030) have attempted to open the scope of the capabilities approach to include future people in the community of justice, arguing that sustainability reflects the universality of life claims: 'the recognition of a shared claim of all to the basic capability to lead worthwhile lives.' They argue that, since we do not know which preferences and capabilities future people will value, 'we can talk of sustainability only in terms of conserving a capacity to produce well-being' (ibid., p. 2035). However, rather than being substitutable by human capital (as Anand and Sen appear to claim), the ESP shows that the biophysical preconditions are pivotal in maintaining the capacity to produce well-being.
Hence, the universality of life claims requires the protection and expansion of people's capabilities today, while at the same time acknowledging the ecosphere's biophysical constraints in order to protect the environmental preconditions on which future people's capabilities depend. This implies incorporating an ethos of restraint, which the capabilities approach has failed to inculcate, but to which the ESP is dedicated.
Another way of putting this is by referring to the differentiation between entitlement-and duty-bearer justice. According to Caney (2009, p. 127) 450). In other words, and in accordance with the ethos of restraint, duty-bearer justice involves the assignment of remedial responsibility to "ecological debtors" -people who exceed their fair share of ecological space -and requires of them a commitment to reduce their environmental impact to the permitted level (Hayward 2006, p. 368; 2007, p. 445; 2009, p. 283; Vanderheiden 2009, pp. 265-266) .
In sum, the integration of the ESP and the capabilities approach meets the need to address issues of both entitlement-and duty-bearer justice. While the capabilities approach emphasizes impartiality and the universality of life claims as the core of entitlement-bearer of the ecosphere's biophysical constraints as a wrongful harm -not only to current, but also to future people (see also Davidson 2008, p. 482). justice, the ESP specifies the collective duty inherent to environmental sustainability on the basis of causal responsibility and ecological debt.
Pattern: according to which principle(s) should distribution take place?
While Sen's comparative approach to justice does not yield a specific distributive principle, Nussbaum (2006, p. 71; 2013, pp. 478, 485-486) argues that the goal of social policies should be understood in terms of getting citizens above a certain capability threshold beneath which human functioning is not available. According to her, people are entitled 'to a life compatible with human dignity, and this entitlement means that the relevant goods must be available at a sufficiently high level' (ibid., p. 292). She distinguishes between capabilities related to human dignity -to be secured equally -and instrumental capabilities that should be secured sufficiently (ibid., pp. 292-293). As mentioned above in our discussion of the currency of distribution, we would rather make the differentiation within capabilities: each capability requires that the corresponding social and material conditions be satisfied. First, in order for people to reach the threshold, social conditions must be secured equally, since they are closely related to human dignity and respect -in which cases it is the equal human dignity and respect that demands recognition (Shue 1999, p. 532; see also Nussbaum 2006, p. 292).
Second, the remainder of this section will focus on the appropriate principle for distributing the material conditions, which ultimately rely on ecological space. Indeed, an equal distribution of ecological space might not be consistent with human dignity or the capability threshold. Take for example the future allocation of GHG emissions entitlements, (Sen 1990, p. 115 ).
According to Sen (1990, pp. 111-112, 120-121; 1999, pp. 70-71) , these interpersonal variations -connected inter alia with gender, genetic endowment, and social and cultural conditions -must form a crucial part of the informational basis of justice, but cannot be incorporated by an egalitarian account of resource distribution. Caney (2009, p. 130, emphasis in original) states that it is therefore implausible to focus on distributing resources equally, 'if doing so will leave people unequal in their ability to pursue various goals.'
In view of this objection, a promising basis for modifying the equal per capita proposal might be provided by Shue's (1993, pp. 56-59) normative differentiation between subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. According to him, 'minimum vital emissions could be viewed as an inalienable private property right, or simply a human subsistence right' (Shue 2001, p. 455) . While subsistence emissions permits should be handed out for free in order not to make the life of the poor impossible, emission permits beyond the necessity threshold should be paid for and be tradable, implying that the rich would bear the burden of climate change mitigation (Shue 1993, p. 59; 2001, p. 455; 2011, p. 307) . This account has been developed further by Vanderheiden (2008, p. 243) , whose modified equal shares model starts from the claim that 'all persons are entitled as a matter of basic rights to survival emissions, or a level of emissions sufficient to allow for their basic human functioning.' These survival emissions should be distributed so as to meet everyone's basic rights, while remaining luxury emissions should be distributed on an equal per capita basis (ibid., pp. 226-227, 243). Such a modified equal shares model might partly meet Sen's concerns about interpersonal variations, since it encompasses people's differential abilities to reach subsistence.
We should like to emphasize that people are entitled 'not only to mere life, but to a life compatible with human dignity' (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 292) and hence, the focus on subsistence or survival should be reformulated as a capability threshold. The focus ultimately remains on securing people's capabilities, and GHG emissions entitlements should be distributed so as to allow everybody to reach the threshold. Considering the capability threshold as the central criterion of distribution shows the important yet instrumental value of GHG emission entitlements. This insight might pre-empt a forceful objection against considering subsistence emissions as a fundamental right. Meeting people's rights to subsistence emissions, Gardiner (2004, p. 585) argues, might have undesirable implications for attempts to tackle climate change: 'if some emissions are deemed morally essential, then they may have to be guaranteed even if this leads to an overall allocation above the scientific optimum.' This objection has also been voiced by Hayward (2007, p. 432-433) , who asserts that we should deny that there is any human right to emissions; rather there is a human right to live in an unpolluted environment. According to him, the worst off do have a right of access to the means for a decent life, but 'emissions are not inherently necessary to fulfill that right' (ibid., p. 432). The problem revealed by the fact that carbon emissions are currently necessary to secure subsistence for most people, is that they are locked into a carbon dependent economy. Shue (2001, p. 451; 2013, p. 392 esp. n. 34 ) acknowledges this issue, and emphasizes that the need for access to GHG emissions in order to reach subsistence is a function of the energy regime that is in place. As long as the lack of affordable sustainable energy makes many or most dependent on fossil fuels, they should be allowed to emit the GHGs necessary to reach the capability threshold level. Obviously, however, the development of alternatives could enable people to reach the threshold with less GHG emissions -and this strategy is clearly necessary to mitigate climate change without exacerbating poverty (Shue 2013). Thus, the focus of developmental policies should be on the advancement of alternative energy, in order to reduce carbon dependence as soon and thoroughly as possible.
Accordingly, the input of the capabilities approach in the integration might tackle the observation that GHG emissions are instrumentally, rather than inherently necessary for a good life.
A sufficientarian principle of distribution based on the capability threshold does not yet fully inculcate the ethos of restraint to which the ESP is dedicated. Environmental sustainability requires that people should refrain from exceeding their fair share of ecological space, and thus that their functionings beyond the capability threshold should be constrained in terms of their ecological space usage (Peeters et al. 2013, pp. 70-71) . Indeed, in mitigating climate change, the second front of action -in addition to the development of alternatives to fossil fuels -is clearly that carbon emissions need to be cut back sharply (Shue 2011, p. 313) .
As regards the distribution of GHG emissions permits beyond the capability threshold, we agree with Vanderheiden (2008, pp. 226-227, 243 ; see above) that the egalitarian principle might be a good candidate. Although this would not meet Sen's objection regarding interpersonal variations, it might be questioned whether equity requires taking account of interpersonal variations in attaining luxury, since people have an interest, but weaker or no rights to luxury emissions (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 243) .
However, some issues related to the determination of the capability threshold have yet to be addressed. Determining what counts as necessary GHG emissions in order to reach the capability threshold seems procedurally odd, for such proposals appear 'to envisage that the climate change problem can be resolved by appealing to some notion of social necessity that is independent of, and not open to, moral assessment ' (Gardiner 2004, p. 586) . Merely focussing on the capability threshold -without a normative assessment of the environmental impact of the GHG emissions necessary to achieve it -will not contribute to climate change mitigation. Moreover, there is 'the implication that there is not necessarily any upper limit to the inefficient emissions that would be permissible in order to reach what might be necessary' (Hayward 2007, p. 441) . Finally, such proposals carry the political risk that there is nothing to stop some people claiming that almost any emission is essential to their way of life (Gardiner 2004, p. 586) .
These concerns are serious, and we can only briefly comment on them. Shue (2001, pp. 454-455) contends that the issue of exceeding the global tolerable total emissions budget by securing the minimum essential for each person is a matter of scientific determination. As argued above, however, scientific advances may well be insufficient to offer a comprehensive resolution, since these issues ultimately depend on political and normative choices.
Additionally, regarding the precise determination of the capability threshold, Nussbaum (2006, p. 402; 2011, pp. 41-42) 147). These questions illustrate the need to take account of both social justice and environmental sustainability: the determination of the precise thresholds must take account of people´s entitlements as well as the ecosphere's biophysical constraints.
In sum, the integration of the ESP and the capabilities approach takes the capability threshold as its main feature. This threshold presupposes the equal provision of social conditions and the sufficient distribution of material conditions (and thus, ecological space).
The ecological space remaining could be distributed on an equal per capita basis, which in effect constrains people's functionings in terms of their ecological space appropriation, consistent with an ethos of restraint.
Conclusion
A comprehensive account of distributive justice needs to incorporate the objectives of both social justice and environmental sustainability. To address the challenge of balancing the competing goals of ensuring current and future people's quality of life and living within the biophysical constraints, we have advocated integrating the ESP and the capabilities approach into an account that encompasses distributive justice between contemporaries as well as between current and future people.
Although admittedly there are methodological, political and normative complications in operationalizing ecological space, the ESP delivers key insights regarding environmental sustainability and the imperative of restraint in view of the ecosphere's biophysical constraints. However, the ESP seems unable to capture social justice, since it focuses on the means to achieve ends, whereas quality of life should be conceived as a relationship between persons and goods. The capabilities approach, in contrast, focuses on the substantive freedoms that are important for well-being, but it has not yet profoundly considered the central requirement of environmental sustainability, i.e. to refrain from transgressing biophysical constraints in order to secure and sustain the environmental preconditions for everyone -now and in the future. Therefore, as the currency of distribution, the integration proposes a hybrid of capabilities and ecological space. Distributive justice should aim at securing and promoting people's capabilities now and in the future, but should also acknowledge that these capabilities are dependent on material conditions -ultimately on biophysical preconditionswhich requires including the ethos of restraint to which the ESP is dedicated.
Concerning the scope of justice, we have argued that the integration can combine the advantage of the ESP regarding the distribution between current and future people with the strength of the capabilities approach regarding distributive justice between contemporaries.
We take the universality of life claims -a key part of the capabilities approach -as the point of departure for entitlement-bearer justice and the application of impartiality, both between contemporaries and between current and future people. The ESP, on the other hand, urges people not to transgress the ecosphere's biophysical constraints in order to ensure the biophysical preconditions for future people. In this way, the ESP assigns moral responsibility to those who exceed their fair share of ecological space and requires them to reduce their environmental impact, which is an issue of duty-bearer justice.
As regards the distributive pattern, we have advocated starting from a capability threshold.
In order for people to reach this threshold, social conditions should be secured equally, whereas material conditions -ultimately dependent on ecological space -should be provided sufficiently. A focus on the capability threshold, rather than the distribution of ecological space itself, can tackle the objection that ecological space is not inherently necessary for human flourishing. The ecological space remaining could then be distributed on an equal per capita basis. In line with this distributive pattern, development policies should clearly focus on making available affordable and sustainable alternatives, and on reducing ecological space appropriation. However, we admit that various issues related to the determination of the threshold in view of the ecosphere's biophysical constraints remain to be addressed. Sen, A. (2013 
